Section 2(b) of the Charter specifically includes, freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication. The Supreme Court used a two-step process in order to determine if Keegstra’s freedom of expression was violated. For the first step, the majority found, since his expression carried meaning, it was secured by section 2(b) of the Charter. The second step consisted of the majority establishing the purpose of section 319(2) of the Criminal Code. They found that the entire basis of this section was to prevent certain manners of expression. Consequently, the majority concluded that section 319(2) of the Criminal Code violates section 2(b) of the Charter. There were arguments that willful promotion of hatred correlates to a violent doing, and therefore is not an expression issue. However, “Mr. Keegstra’s expression consisted of words, while violence is expression communicated directly through physical harm. For this reason, even hate propaganda is expression within the meaning of s. 2(b).” Another argument was that hate propaganda causes threats of violence, and subsequently it does not fall under section 2(b). Again the Supreme Court ignored this claim for the reason that treats of violence are forms of expression. Freedom of expression, set under section 2(b) of the Charter does it jobs perfectly, in the sense …show more content…
This section has come under criticism, however, this certain circumstance highlighted the advantages of this section. The majority used the Oakes test to see whether section 319(2) of the Criminal Code violating section 2(b) of the Charter is justified under section 1 of the Charter. Firstly, the majority decided the objective in this situation was important enough to warrant overriding a right written in the Charter. The objective in this situation was a pressing concern for Canada as a country; hate propaganda leading to greater racial and religious issues in this nation. Secondly, the majority tried to figure out if section 319(2) of the Criminal Code was a just response to this objective. They found that there was a connection between “s. 319(2) and of protecting target group members and fostering harmonious social relations.” Thirdly, the majority determined whether section 319(2) does as little as possible to weaken freedom of expression. They concluded it does, as section 319(2) solely affects forms of expression which negatively target certain groups. Finally, the majority decided if section 319(2) effects freedom of expression in proportion to the objective for Canada. They found, “that hate propaganda contributes