However, Robert W. Cox (2209) adds, “many works in political science dealing with Somalia are written from a ‘problem-solving perspective’ rather than analytical or critical.”
The objective in mind is of course to try to find a viable means of changing the situation in Somalia, sometimes including its substantial Diaspora communities, but the majority of works with this ambition …show more content…
“(2) Criminal elements, particularly in smaller groups, have had an interest and a profit motive in combating law and order.” Menkhaus tells us that this “group has similarly deteriorated in importance, mainly after 1999 as the Somali business community has withdrawn its support.” Then he pursues stating that, the latter have shifted away from the war economy of 1988-1992 era. This to participate in more ordinary business to which criminality and instability are “liabilities rather than assets.” And finally concludes, “(3) Risk-averse actors, including both political and business communities stand loose more from the establishment of a state than from its …show more content…
It is best not to measure up “state-formation in Somali with the formation of a unitary state but with a states-system” that differs over time with regard to “its norms and to the strategies of different players to gain influence, power and, ultimately supremacy, as well as the strategies of these players to avoid risk, exposure and threats to their survival.” The presence of many political units who retain control over the means of “organized violence and revenue of some kind and do not bow to any higher authority is the basis for this claim.” Such as in many historical regional sub-level systems, outside actors have been an important factor in Somalia as they have pursued to acquire influence and power as well as to prevent risks to their “interests and / or survival through the use of clients and sometimes direct military