The enactment of the Act
In order to analyse whether …show more content…
This bill was not the piece of legislation that is enacted today, but was the bill that introduced the current method of thinking. This bill was far more harsh that the bill at hand today on many grounds, and as such has been amended. For example, this first bill could have potentially allowed the ASIO to use its detention and questioning powers to civilians as young as 14 years old, if there were ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ that using the powers would ‘substantially assist the collection of intelligence that [was] important in relation to a terrorism offence’, and this questioning could have extended up to 48 hours without being able to contact family or a lawyer. Furthermore, although each warrant was effective for 48 hours, there was no limit to how many warrant one could be issued, meaning that detention could effectively be …show more content…
These should be looked at to assess the purpose of the act and examine whether it has been successful in balancing several competing interests of human rights and protection from terrorism. This Act was meant to be the perfect balancing tool that used in a state of emergency after the 9/11 attack, which is why The Commonwealth Attorney-General, exclaimed that the attack of 9/11 needs to be addressed in an Australian context. He thought that post attack, it is clear that every country around the world could incur similar catastrophic disaster, and that not one country is safe from terror. According to the Commonwealth Attorney-General, ‘there is no specific threat to Australia at that time’ but after the Indonesian Bali bombing in late 2002, there was something needed to be put in place to protect the Australian people ‘against [an] known threat’. This makes sense, and covers one side of the trade off, but doesn’t address or consider the fact that these powers are too expansive and dangerous in application. As part of his reasoning, Daryl Williams accepted that these laws, especially the questioning and detention warrants were in fact extraordinary. Yet, he justified these means by exclaiming that the rules may be extraordinary in nature, but the threat of terror and potential disaster that may occur is equally extraordinary in nature. He quotes that terrorism is ‘quite unlike ordinary