“...The oil flow from the well was 53,000-62,000 barrels a day from April until the well was capped on July 15th. This is equivalent to a spill the size of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill...every 4 to 5 days.” (Roach, Harris & Williamson, 2010) The Halliburton Company installed a defective concrete cap, but BP ignored reports of this problem shortly before the part failed. (Pallardy, 2010) The Deepwater Horizon disaster took the lives of several crewmembers and BP was, in fact, charged with one count of negligence and 11 counts of manslaughter. Yet regulation has been slow and oil spills continue to occur regularly, though one of this scale and impact has not occurred …show more content…
One of the main problems with the NRDA is that the findings of the assessment cannot be released until after litigation is complete, which takes years. This means that the latest science cannot be factored into policy-makers decisions; in fact, new drilling permits were issued in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster without consideration for the NRDA process due to its lack of transparency. This gave BP a clear upper hand and left communities, whose tax money funds these assessments, out of the process and likely contributed to the uncertainty and chronic stress that afflicts victims of technological disasters. (Nichols & Kildow, 2014) Additionally, this makes it more difficult to pass legislation which policymakers would be poised to make due to public awareness and grassroots activism that typically occurs after a disaster of this nature. (Picou, Gill, & Cohen, 1999) The “atrophy of vigilance” over time means that there is a certain window of time during which legislation is likely to be passed. Estimates of economic impact have had to be done only with some data voluntary released by BP. One estimate placed the damages between $40 and $100 billion. By contrast, the compensation fund set up by BP in the aftermath of the