Introduction
The failure of the Iraq and Afghanistan War has triggered an immense increase in the number of academic literature regarding asymmetrical warfare. It is generally assumed that the power disparity between a strong state and a weaker non-state opponent would permit the stronger adversary to win. However, history illustrates a different picture, since weak non-state actors have been the side reaping victory. This paper will limit its scope by examining why strong counterinsurgent state actors lose in asymmetrical wars, which will ultimately explain why weaker insurgents win. This paper adopts the dictum that counterinsurgent actors lose when they do not win the war, and non-state insurgent actors win when they do not lose the war. …show more content…
Throughout history, strong counterinsurgents have demonstrated their failure to amalgamate different tactics and game plan into a single comprehensive strategy (Greenhill & Staniland 2007). For example, the Roman’s defeat in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, Britain’s defeat in the American Revolution, Britain’s loss in the American Revolution, the French in the Peninsular War, the French in Indochina and the Algerian Revolution, U.S. in the Vietnam War, the Soviet Army in the Soviet-Afghan War and Chechnya, and the U.S. in Somalia, are some of the cases that demonstrates strong states losing asymmetrical wars (Cassidy 2000, p.42). However, it is important to take into consideration that these cases are not identical. The outcome of the Peninsular War, the American Revolution, and the Vietnam War demonstrate that these strong actors failed to acquire victory against their opponents who combined conventional and unconventional warfare tactics. This frequent phenomenon elucidates that strong counterinsurgents who have a powerful army are incapable of innovating their tactics to their …show more content…
A strong state battling an insurgency has two ideal type of strategic approaches to choose from, direct and indirect. The former approach represents conventional warfare tactics and defence, whereas the latter approach for the counterinsurgent denotes various kinds of barbarism, and terrorism and guerilla tactics for the insurgent group Arreguin-Toft’s (2001). Direct strategic approaches are employed to destroy the opponent’s armed forces with the intent of crushing its physical ability to battle, whereas indirect approaches are used to thwart the opponent’s will to fight. Arreguin-Toft (2001) reveals that when a strong actor chooses to employ direct approaches against their opponent who is defending with an indirect strategy, the stronger actor tends to lose. Insurgents generally adopt indirect strategies to battle against the counterinsurgents, such as guerilla warfare, which comprises of irregular combatants who are difficult to discern from noncombatants when they are not in the
The failure of the Iraq and Afghanistan War has triggered an immense increase in the number of academic literature regarding asymmetrical warfare. It is generally assumed that the power disparity between a strong state and a weaker non-state opponent would permit the stronger adversary to win. However, history illustrates a different picture, since weak non-state actors have been the side reaping victory. This paper will limit its scope by examining why strong counterinsurgent state actors lose in asymmetrical wars, which will ultimately explain why weaker insurgents win. This paper adopts the dictum that counterinsurgent actors lose when they do not win the war, and non-state insurgent actors win when they do not lose the war. …show more content…
Throughout history, strong counterinsurgents have demonstrated their failure to amalgamate different tactics and game plan into a single comprehensive strategy (Greenhill & Staniland 2007). For example, the Roman’s defeat in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, Britain’s defeat in the American Revolution, Britain’s loss in the American Revolution, the French in the Peninsular War, the French in Indochina and the Algerian Revolution, U.S. in the Vietnam War, the Soviet Army in the Soviet-Afghan War and Chechnya, and the U.S. in Somalia, are some of the cases that demonstrates strong states losing asymmetrical wars (Cassidy 2000, p.42). However, it is important to take into consideration that these cases are not identical. The outcome of the Peninsular War, the American Revolution, and the Vietnam War demonstrate that these strong actors failed to acquire victory against their opponents who combined conventional and unconventional warfare tactics. This frequent phenomenon elucidates that strong counterinsurgents who have a powerful army are incapable of innovating their tactics to their …show more content…
A strong state battling an insurgency has two ideal type of strategic approaches to choose from, direct and indirect. The former approach represents conventional warfare tactics and defence, whereas the latter approach for the counterinsurgent denotes various kinds of barbarism, and terrorism and guerilla tactics for the insurgent group Arreguin-Toft’s (2001). Direct strategic approaches are employed to destroy the opponent’s armed forces with the intent of crushing its physical ability to battle, whereas indirect approaches are used to thwart the opponent’s will to fight. Arreguin-Toft (2001) reveals that when a strong actor chooses to employ direct approaches against their opponent who is defending with an indirect strategy, the stronger actor tends to lose. Insurgents generally adopt indirect strategies to battle against the counterinsurgents, such as guerilla warfare, which comprises of irregular combatants who are difficult to discern from noncombatants when they are not in the