So why does the theory proposed in section 2 help explain the failure of the League of Nations better than the one in section 3? The answer lies in the historical background leading up to the formation of the League of Nations. The LN was a massive endeavor aimed at controlling or limiting various aspects of the independent militaries as well as the European economy. The treaty of Versailles attempted to govern much more that had ever been attempted to govern before – there was territorial resettlement, there were war settlements, there was society rebuilding, etc. All this leads to the issue: what is doing the enforcing? After the formation of the LN, there was no nation doing the enforcement. After the devastation of all of Europe, the assumption was that if a single nation had the manpower to provide for the enforcement apparatus then it should have relatively easy. The population was smaller, society was destroyed, and economies were in ruin; but there was no semblance of a sweeping force to stabilize the whole area, and disallow the feelings of resentment to brew back into strong nationalist sentiment. All of Parent’s factors were present: there was the continual threat of new war, there were elites, there was symmetry of this threat, and Europe had just experienced the greatest crisis point known to mankind at that …show more content…
During the formation of the LN, there was a lack of the other mechanisms that so successfully united the 13 states of the U.S. There was a lack of threatened force, there was a lack of legislative cheating, there was a lack of bully politics by the remaining major power in the world to enforce any of the League of Nations decrees. Instead, the framers went the complete opposite direction; they advocated pacifism and the United States withdrew from any type of military/peacekeeping commitments in the region. The remaining power that was the U.S. should have gathered up the remaining military forces and occupied every major city as a peacekeeping force, and given them the authority to use violence to enforce policies. Instead, “there would be no League army and no compulsory arbitration or disarmament.” (Macmillan, 94). What then happened was Britain and France, due to the withdrawal of the U.S. from the LN, decided to press Germany into war repayment, which led to a spiral of nationalist sentiment ending in the encroachment of the Treaty of Versailles by Hitler, and outright