Though the Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins dealt primarily with the burden of proof for holding employers liable for discrimination, it confirmed that allowing gender stereotypes to influence an employment decision was impermissible. In Price, Ann Hopkins’s gender influenced a decision to put her promotion to partner in a law firm on hold. As with the unequal burdens claim, the specific reasons for denying Jespersen’s stereotyping claim varied across courts. The district court held that Price did not apply to appearance policies, and the three-judge panel said that Price would apply only in the case of sexual harassment. All of the Ninth Circuit judges recognized that Price covered appearance standards, but the majority differentiated Jespersen’s case from Hopkins’s because Jespersen did not show that stereotyping motivated an employment decision that objectively impeded her. Four dissenting judges argued that Price did not precisely define what evidence was necessary to establish stereotyping. They reasoned that the makeup policy itself was sufficient, since makeup use is based on fundamental cultural assumptions about the unattractiveness of the female face. Accordingly, those four judges would give heed to the fact that high heels are a cultural norm representing “abstinence from productive employment” and thereby reinforcing an assumption that their wearers, women, do not belong in the
Though the Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins dealt primarily with the burden of proof for holding employers liable for discrimination, it confirmed that allowing gender stereotypes to influence an employment decision was impermissible. In Price, Ann Hopkins’s gender influenced a decision to put her promotion to partner in a law firm on hold. As with the unequal burdens claim, the specific reasons for denying Jespersen’s stereotyping claim varied across courts. The district court held that Price did not apply to appearance policies, and the three-judge panel said that Price would apply only in the case of sexual harassment. All of the Ninth Circuit judges recognized that Price covered appearance standards, but the majority differentiated Jespersen’s case from Hopkins’s because Jespersen did not show that stereotyping motivated an employment decision that objectively impeded her. Four dissenting judges argued that Price did not precisely define what evidence was necessary to establish stereotyping. They reasoned that the makeup policy itself was sufficient, since makeup use is based on fundamental cultural assumptions about the unattractiveness of the female face. Accordingly, those four judges would give heed to the fact that high heels are a cultural norm representing “abstinence from productive employment” and thereby reinforcing an assumption that their wearers, women, do not belong in the