Maoz and Russett (1993) conducted statistical analyses to determine the empirical accuracy of the two models. Specifically, in a critical test of the normative and structural models, Maoz and Russett find that when the level of democratic norms are low and level of political constraints are high the normative model predicts a high probability of conflict. In contrast, when democratic norms are high and political constraints are low the structural model predicts the likelihood of conflict. However, empirical evidence in statistical analyses of the these tests provide more consistent data for the normative model. In a statistical analysis of conflict involvement, of the dyads from 1946 to 1986, they find that when testing stability between two democratic countries, high norms and low constraints provide a .00% probability of disputes; proving that high norms lead to lower conflict involvement. This evidence proves that stability is achieved through democratic norms rather than constraints. Furthermore, when looking at war involvement, domestic conflict with high norms and low constraints has .00% probability of dispute whereas low norms and high constraints has .56% probably of dispute. This data provides more consistent support for the normative model as the best explanation for the democratic peace. The empirical evidence for the structural model is not as uniform. The normative model better explains that due established norms within democracies, they are less prone to conflict making them more
Maoz and Russett (1993) conducted statistical analyses to determine the empirical accuracy of the two models. Specifically, in a critical test of the normative and structural models, Maoz and Russett find that when the level of democratic norms are low and level of political constraints are high the normative model predicts a high probability of conflict. In contrast, when democratic norms are high and political constraints are low the structural model predicts the likelihood of conflict. However, empirical evidence in statistical analyses of the these tests provide more consistent data for the normative model. In a statistical analysis of conflict involvement, of the dyads from 1946 to 1986, they find that when testing stability between two democratic countries, high norms and low constraints provide a .00% probability of disputes; proving that high norms lead to lower conflict involvement. This evidence proves that stability is achieved through democratic norms rather than constraints. Furthermore, when looking at war involvement, domestic conflict with high norms and low constraints has .00% probability of dispute whereas low norms and high constraints has .56% probably of dispute. This data provides more consistent support for the normative model as the best explanation for the democratic peace. The empirical evidence for the structural model is not as uniform. The normative model better explains that due established norms within democracies, they are less prone to conflict making them more