. . [while capital remained] . . . privately owned” (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988 24). Przeworski and Wallerstein, however, argue that “virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and shareholders is compatible with continual private investment” with only “anticipations of future threats to shareholders’ consumption . . . [reducing] . . . investment and [imposing] costs on wage earners” (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988 24). Appropriately, the only concern would be whether, or when, “the future benefits to wage earners [would] outweigh the costs incurred during the transition period,” since, according to Keynes, “‘if a state is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the instruments and the basic reward to those who own them, it will have accomplished all that is necessary’” (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988 …show more content…
. . left his government awash with cash . . . [which] he used . . . to expand welfare provision,” and these “stronger public finances have brought economic stability” to the nation (“The explosive apex of Evo’s power” 2). In accordance with Przeworski and Wallerstein’s theory, Mr. Morales could have distributed consumption compatibly with continual private investment; however, he chose to nationalize private assets, which may have decreased the transition period during which costs could be incurred, thus avoiding adding the burden of costs on wage earners.
In my opinion, Przeworski and Wallerstein would predict that the future of Morales’s ‘Social Revolution’ is uncertain due to the fact that the state would be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense. As mentioned before, the result of the continual expectation of threats would lead to a fall in investment and result in additional costs for wage earners, with no guarantee that the costs of the transition period would be compensated with future benefits (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988