For example, North Korea developed their missile technology from reverse-engineering Soviet Scud-type missiles that they acquired from Egypt in the early 1980s (Moniz). As for their nuclear program, “PyongYang received Moscow’s help from the late 1950s to the 1980s: it helped build a nuclear research reactor, provided missile designs, light-water reactors, and some nuclear fuel.” (Albert). Furthermore, Russian missile experts were present in North Korea in the 1990s and reports of Soviet missile transfers to North Korea (Schiller). Not to mention that according to Schiller, “for most of the North Korean missiles, Soviet counterparts have been identified. Cyrillic lettering was found on North Korean missile parts…”. In addition, “there are insider statements as well as strong indications that the Nodong engine is a old Soviet design, as is the Scud C.” (Schiller). Although North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world, U.S. State Departments estimate it spends roughly a quarter of its GDP on its military (Albert). Obviously, a portion of this spending is allocated to the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. North Korea began to produce Nodong medium range ballistic missiles with the assistance of Iran in the early 1990s (Moniz). Another indicator for North Korea's military development were the …show more content…
“It seems that the regime never was very serious about learning how well its missile performed. It rather used its few launches for diplomatic signaling,” Schiller claimed. Not to mention, of the 26 missiles north korea has launched in the past 28 years, 14 took place on only two occasions: July 4th (U.S. time) and U.S. Independence Day (Schiller). Thusly, this evidence seems to substantiate claims that the pattern of testing strongly suggests a political intent. In addition, Schiller explains, “The North Korean missile program largely appears to be a political tool to gain strategic leverage, to fortify the regimes domestic power.”. Pollack adds to Schiller's claim by saying, “The development of ICBMs thus provides North Korea a means to punch above its weight, and place it on a nominal par with the world's major nuclear powers.” Moreover, there is currently no valid reason to assume that Pyongyang will halt its weapons