Professor Belco
Federalist No. 47: Separate, Equal, and Shared Powers in the Government The Federalist Papers were written to support the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and to emphasize the need for the Constitution to the many states that did not support the approval. In the Constitution, the three branches of government were separate and equal, but also unified in certain aspects to keep the other branches in order. The Federalists believed that this separation would allow for liberty for the citizens and avoid tyranny. On the other hand, the Anti-Federalists, or critics of the ratification, argued that the Constitution challenged separation of powers due to these checks and balances. Showing support for the ratification, …show more content…
Madison begins his argument by using Montesquieu’s comprehension of the British Constitution on the separation of powers. He infers that “‘there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united’” (Fed 47 299). Even though Montesquieu reasons that the British Constitution provides liberty, the British Constitution states that the different departments of the government shares powers. Madison uses Montesquieu’s analysis of the British Constitution on how “the executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority” and how “all members of the judiciary department are appointed by” the executive power (Fed 47 299). This suggests that liberty can still be in existence even if the branches can keep the other branches in order, since the British Constitution has certain powers that reach into different branches. Even though Montesquieu states that there is no liberty when different branches share power, Madison believes that Montesquieu’s argument supports the idea that the government can have separate powers with a certain …show more content…
Madison utilizes the state constitutions in his argument to convey that the U.S. Constitution is not inexplicable because even the states have an amount of mixture in the governmental branches. Madison’s first example is of New Hampshire, which “mixes these departments” by allowing “the Senate, which is a branch of the legislative,” but “is also a judicial tribunal for” impeachments (Fed 47 301). Even though New Hampshire declares, “that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate” from each other, there is still unification of these branches (Fed 47 301). This constitution supports Madison’s argument that the U.S. Constitution did not violate the principle of separation of powers because each branch is separate in its own respect but has certain aspects that allow it to maintain control of certain aspects of other branches. In fact, New Hampshire’s system of how the Senate can impeach the President is very similar to the powers in the Constitution. In Massachusetts, the state constitution “goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another” but, “a partial mixture of powers have been admitted” (Fed 47 301).